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RECONSIDERING VIRGINIA JUDICIAL SELECTION
Carl W. Tobias *

The 2008 Virginia General Assembly adjourned this summer
without electing judges to vacancies on the State Corporation
Commission (the "Commission" or "SCC"), the Supreme Court of
Virginia, and numerous circuit courts. Thus, Democratic Governor Tim Kaine recently appointed practicing lawyer and former
SCC counsel James Dimitri to the Commission, Court of Appeals
of Virginia Judge LeRoy Millette to the supreme court, Chesterfield Circuit Judge Cleo Powell to the opening created by Judge
Millette's elevation, and numerous attorneys as circuit court
judges. Although the jurists whom the Governor appointed seem
very well-qualified, the judges may only serve for five months, unless the 2009 General Assembly elects them. The 2008 Assembly's
failure to elect judges for these vacancies demonstrates that the
selection process is ineffective, and perhaps broken, as this development has eroded the delivery of justice and may have undermined public respect for judicial selection. The process for choosing judges, therefore, deserves reassessment to ascertain whether
the system merits reform. This piece undertakes that effort.
This article first evaluates the origins and development of Virginia's procedure for appointing judges. This analysis determines
that Virginia and South Carolina are the only jurisdictions that
currently select judges through a process of legislative election.
The examination also discerns that the Old Dominion has employed this system throughout most of its history since the American Revolution. The regime concomitantly operated rather efficaciously for much of the time when one major political party
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controlled the governorship and both houses of the General Assembly. Moreover, the review finds that legislators and additional
observers have articulated, evaluated, and discussed various suggestions for change over the years and that the Assembly has recently instituted or experimented with some, but it has permanently adopted very few.
The second section assesses recent developments which implicate judicial selection in the Old Dominion. The section finds that
increasing partisanship and divisiveness have attended the
process for choosing judges, especially with the rise and growth of
a real two-party system as well as divided government in Virginia. The portion shows how the experience in the 2008 General Assembly-which failed in one regular and two special sessions to
elect judges for numerous vacancies, despite a plethora of opportunities to name the jurists-suggests that the system is ineffective, if not beyond remediation.
The final section, accordingly, explores numerous recommendations for future treatment of judicial selection in Virginia. This
part descriptively evaluates the benefits afforded and disadvantages imposed by the processes that many other states employ
when choosing members of the bench. The section concludes by
proffering a number of solutions which appear to hold the greatest promise for improving Virginia judicial selection.
I. THE HISTORY OF VIRGINIA JUDICIAL SELECTION
The origins and development of judicial selection in the Old
Dominion might seem to warrant relatively little exploration in
this paper, as that background has been treated elsewhere.1 Nonetheless, considerable analysis is appropriate because this examination should inform appreciation of the problems that arose
historically when naming judges, of the recent complications, and
of possible remedies for those difficulties.

1. See, e.g., THOMAS R. MORRIS, THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT: AN INSTITUTIONAL
AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1975); W. Hamilton Bryson, JudicialIndependence in Virginia,
38 U. RICH. L. REV. 705 (2004); J. Amy Dillard, Separate and Obedient: The JudicialQualification Missing from the Job Description, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (2007); Alex B. Long, An
HistoricalPerspective on Judicial Selection Methods in Virginia and West Virginia, 18 J.L.
& POL. 691, 730-66 (2002).
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Throughout much of Virginia's history, the Commonwealth has
essentially followed the judicial selection regime that the state
presently employs. 2 This system provides for the General Assembly to elect judges unless a vacancy occurs when the legislature is
not in session or the Assembly adjourns without electing judges to
openings. 3 In those circumstances, the Governor appoints the
judge, who serves until the next legislative session at which time
the Assembly may either elect the gubernatorial appointee or
someone else. 4
Virginia and South Carolina are the only jurisdictions in the
United States that authorize their legislatures to elect judges.5 A
substantial number of jurisdictions employ some form of popular
election, although certain states prescribe initial gubernatorial
appointment with subsequent retention elections. 6 Moreover, a
significant number of jurisdictions rely on several types of merit
selection commissions, which recommend multiple prospects to
the Governor, who appoints from that group. 7 A few states employ selection regimes that resemble the federal system because
the jurisdictions have gubernatorial nomination with legislative
advice and consent. 8

2. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. For analyses that emphasize the earlier history, see
Bryson, supra note 1; Long, supra note 1. For analysis that emphasizes the recent history,
see Dillard, supra note 1. See generally 2 A.E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 739-46 (1974).
3. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7.

4. See id.
5. See supra note 2; S.C. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 9, 14. For analysis of South Carolina,
see Martin Scott Driggers, Jr., South Carolina's Experiment: Legislative Control of Judicial Merit Selection, 49 S.C. L. REV. 1217 (1998); Kimberly C. Petillo, Note, The Untouchables: The Impact of South Carolina'sNew JudicialSelection System on the South Carolina Supreme Court, 1997-2003, 67 ALB. L. REV. 937 (2003).
6. See Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 277
(2002); Long, supra note 1, at 702-03; LARRY C. BERKSON, AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y,
JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A SPECIAL REPORT 2-3, http://www.ajs.
org/selectionldocs/Berkson.pdf. See generally ABA, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE
ABA COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY (2003), http://www.abanet.org/jud
indljeopardy/pdflreport.pdf.
7. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 301-02; Long, supra note 1, at 702;
BERKSON, supra note 6, at 2-3. A commission advises the South Carolina General Assembly. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-19-10 to -20 (2005). Somewhat analogous panels have been
used in the federal system. See generally LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: ITS MEMBERS, PROCEDURES
AND CANDIDATES (1980); ALAN NEFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE NOMINATING
COMMISSIONS: THEIR MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND CANDIDATES (1981).
8. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 300-01; Long, supra note 1, at 702;
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At various historical junctures, the Commonwealth has relied
upon elements of several regimes canvassed in the paragraph
immediately above. The first Constitution of Virginia in 1776
provided for the General Assembly to elect appellate judges, who
would "continue in office during good behaviour," thus essentially
instituting life tenure, an important constituent of the federal
system. 9 The 1851 Virginia Constitution replaced legislative election with election by the voting populace, while the document
substituted a term of years for the equivalent of life tenure.lO The
popular election of judges, however, proved to be relatively shortlived, as the 1870 Constitution provided for General Assembly
election of all Virginia judges for a term of years with the possibility of reelection.11 The Commonwealth reinstituted the earlier
legislative election approach because General Assembly members
12
wanted to employ judgeships as political patronage.
This system has basically remained intact since 1870.13 Article
VI, section 7 of the Constitution of Virginia provides that supreme court justices and "judges of all other courts of record shall
be chosen by the vote of a majority of the members elected to each
house of the General Assembly" with justices serving twelve-year
terms and all other judges serving for eight years. 14 The constitution also states that, if a judicial vacancy occurs "while the General Assembly is not in session, the Governor may appoint a successor to serve until thirty days after the commencement of the

BERKSON, supra note 6, at 2-3; see also U.S. CONST. arts. II, III.
9. See VA. CONST. of 1776 art. XIV; see also U.S. CONST. art. III; VA. CONST. of 1830
art. V, § 1; Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 300; Bryson, supra note 1, at 711.
10. See VA. CONST. of 1851 art. VI, §§ 6, 10, 27, 34; see also Bryson, supra note 1, at
711. "The rejected 1861 Constitution, Art. VI, § 5, would have returned to the 1830 Constitution's principle of tenure in office during good behavior after appointment.
HOWARD, supra note 2, at 741 n.5.
11. See VA. CONST. of 1870 art. VI, §§ 5, 11, 13, 14; see also Bryson, supra note 1, at
712; Long, supra note 1, at 751; supra notes 6, 9, 10 and accompanying text.
12. See JACK P. MADDEX, JR., THE VIRGINIA CONSERVATIVES 1867-1879: A STUDY IN
RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 92-93 (1970); see also Bryson, supra note 1, at 712.
13. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7; VA. CONST. of 1902 art. VI, §§ 91, 96, 99; see also
HOWARD, supra note 2, at 739-46. See generally Bryson, supra note 1, at 712.
14. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. The Constitution of Virginia was last revised in 1971. See
id. 'The Commission on Constitutional Revision considered alternative plans," including
most that were analyzed supranotes 6-8 and accompanying text, but it "saw no advantage
to those plans over the method of judicial selection in Virginia." HOWARD, supra note 2, at
742 (citations omitted). The revision predated the advent of large-scale expenditures in
judicial elections.
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[Assembly's] next session... [and,] [u]pon election by the General
Assembly," a new jurist shall commence serving a full term. 15
The selection process has generally functioned efficaciously
when one of the principal parties controlled the Governor's Mansion and both houses of the General Assembly, as was true for
most of the time since the regime's 1870 adoption.16 The procedure for choosing judges has operated less smoothly over the past
few decades with the rise and expansion of the modern Virginia
Republican party and the corresponding phenomenon of divided
government in which the Governor has been a member of one
party and the other party has possessed a majority in either the
Senate or the House of Delegates.1 7 For much of the period when
Democrats controlled the governorship and both General Assembly houses, Republican senators and delegates had relatively little input on the choice of judges. Thus, it should not have been
surprising that once Republicans secured control of the Governor's Mansion as well as the Senate and the House, Democratic
legislators would contribute minimally to judicial selection.
Over the last dozen years, relations between Virginia Democrats and Republicans in the General Assembly have been contentious, a phenomenon witnessed most relevantly in the gradual
deterioration of the judicial selection process. For example, in
1996, the Assembly failed to fill thirty percent of the openings because of partisan infighting, which allowed Republican Governor
George Allen to appoint judges for these vacancies once the legislature adjourned.1S The next year, Democrats and Republicans
vehemently disagreed over the election of someone to fill the supreme court vacancy created by Justice Roscoe Stephenson's retirement; the controversy terminated in a stalemate, thus permit-

15. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. If the Assembly adjourns without filling vacancies, as
happened in 2008, the Governor may appoint judges to those openings. See id.
16. Professor Bryson found one major historical exception in the 1870s and 1880s,
which he believes posed a threat to judicial independence; the situation, however, prevailed for a rather short time. See Bryson, supra note 1, at 708-12. See generally
MARGARET VIRGINIA NELSON, A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN VIRGINIA, 1789-1928, at
110-20 (1947).
17. For somewhat analogous developments at the federal level, see BENJAMIN WITrES,
CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN ANGRY TIMES (2006); Carl
Tobias, Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. 527
(1998).
18. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 10; see also Ross MacKenzie, Editorial, On the Growing Partisanizationof the General Assembly, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 19, 1997, at F7.
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ting Governor Allen to appoint the replacement.1 9 In 1998, the
parties engaged in a "nine-hour standoff," which left thirty judgeships unfilled, although legislators eventually agreed to elect
judges for practically all of the openings. 20
Once the Republican party captured the governorship and the
General Assembly, Republicans predictably limited Democratic
input in judicial appointments, but Republican Senate and House
members also instituted certain measures that modified the selection process. In 1998, Assembly Republicans and Democrats
began considering the establishment of an informal Joint Judicial
Advisory Committee that would screen supreme court and court
of appeals candidates.21 The fourteen-member Advisory Committee, comprised of numerous former Republican and Democratic
leaders, secured background information, financial disclosure reports, and writing samples from candidates and solicited input
from state and local bar associations. 2 2 Civic organizations and
citizens then interviewed the prospective judges and submitted
recommendations to the Assembly for vacancies on the two appellate courts. 2 3 In 2000, a joint resolution of both General Assembly
houses concomitantly requested that the supreme court formulate
evaluation criteria to assist the Assembly in electing judges.24
Notwithstanding these modifications, the selection process has
grown increasingly controversial. Certain observers voiced concern that the program for assessing candidates might threaten

19. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 11; Long, supra note 1, at 696-97.
20. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 12; Pamela Stallsmith, 10 Judges Elected; 1 Spot
Open, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 16, 1998, at As.
21. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 12-14; Long, supra note 1, at 697; Margaret Edds,
Op-Ed., Picking Judges: You Can't Take Rice out of Rice Pudding,VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Mar.
5, 2000, at J5.
22.
See Dillard, supra note 1, at 13-14; Long, supra note 1, at 697; Edds, supra note
21; Ruth S. Intress, Republicans Present 14 Finalists for Judgeships, RICH. TIMESDISPATCH, Feb. 23, 2000, at A8.
23. See Long, supra note 1, at 697. In 2000, Republican Assembly members also established local citizen committees in some localities that would complement suggestions of
local bar associations. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 13; Long, supra note 1, at 697; GOP
Forms Judges Panel, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 11, 2000, at B4; see also Carl Tobias,
Senators Worked Together To Fill the 4th Circuit, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, July 15, 2007, at
El (analyzing a somewhat analogous federal entity).
24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-100 (Cum. Supp. 2008); H.J. Res. 212, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2000); Dillard, supra note 1, at 7; Long, supra note 1, at 697. "2009 is the
first year that judges up for reappointment will have had a sufficient number of performance evaluations for legislators to review." Michelle Washington, Lawmakers To Get
Brief Shot at Filling JudicialVacancies, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Apr. 21, 2008, at Al.
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judicial independence, 25 while others expressed concern that specific regions of Virginia were neglected or that Republicans dominated the Advisory Committee's membership. 2 6 Indeed, the Republican General Assembly refused to reelect certain judges
whom earlier Democratic Assemblies had elected. 2 7 The gradually deteriorating interparty relations worsened in the 2008 General Assembly session when the legislature was unable to elect
judges for more than a dozen vacancies, including openings on the
SCC and the supreme court. These developments are explored
next.

II.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The 2008 General Assembly had the opportunity to elect two
Supreme Court of Virginia justices, two court of appeals judges,
and numerous circuit court judges. In fairness, Governor Kaine
had appointed Justice Bernard Goodwyn to the supreme court
and Judge Millette to the court of appeals when vacancies materialized after the 2007 Assembly session had adjourned. 2 8 Moreover, Justice Steven Agee did not officially resign from the supreme court until July 2008, while Judge Millette's court of
appeals seat only became vacant when Governor Kaine appointed
the jurist to the opening that Justice Agee's resignation created. 29
Nonetheless, Republicans initially withheld their support for Justice Goodwyn and Judge Millette, although the 2008 Assembly
eventually elected them.30 Moreover, President George W. Bush

25. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 18-29; Long, supra note 1, at 698; Matthew Dolan,
State Looks at Ways To Judge the Judges, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 29, 2001, at Al.
26. See Long, supra note 1, at 698; Edds, supra note 21; Laurence Hammack, Lawyer
Wins Judgeship on Merits of His Case, ROANOKE TIMES, May 30, 2000, at B1; see also
Washington, supra note 24.
27. See Dillard, supra note 1, at 18-29; Cindy Clayton & Matthew Dolan, Former
Deputy Prosecutor in Line for Norfolk Bench, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 20, 2001, at B1; Michael Sluss, Judge's Plight Sparks Debate, ROANOKE TIMES, Feb. 17, 2001, at Al; see also
supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
28. See Anita Kumar, Kaine Appoints Circuit Judge to Supreme Court, WASH. POST,
Oct. 11, 2007, at B6; Anita Kumar & Sandhya Somashekhar, Va. Senate Panel Rejects
Tax-Relief Plan That Passed Last Year, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2008, at B1; Jerry Markon,
Sniper Judge Is Named to Appeals Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2007, at B4.
29. See Jerry Markon, U.S. Appeals Court Gets New Judge, WASH. POST, July 31,
2008, at VAl; Neil H. Simon & Jeff E. Schapiro, Agee Wins OK from Senate, RICH. TIMESDISPATCH, May 21, 2008, at B3.
30. See Kumar & Somashekhar, supra note 28; Jerry Markon, Sniper Judge Takes
Seat on Top Va. Court, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2008, at PW3 [hereinafter Markon, Sniper
Judge]; Jeff E. Schapiro, Kaine To Fill Judgeships Amid Lawmaker Gridlock, RICH.
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had nominated Justice Agee to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in mid-March of 2008, to which the Senate confirmed the jurist in May; thus, the 2008 Assembly could rather
easily have anticipated and provided for the supreme court vacancy that Agee's elevation created.31
The 2008 Assembly had myriad opportunities to elect judges
because the Virginia Senate and House of Delegates convened in
one regular session and two special sessions. For example, numerous media outlets reported that legislators had reached an
agreement regarding certain vacancies and even reported the
names of some prospects whom the Assembly was considering for
the openings. 32 The Democratic Senate and the Republican
House of Delegates, however, were ultimately unable to forge
consensus while Republicans in both chambers seemingly disagreed among themselves. 33
When a vacancy occurs while the General Assembly is not in
session, or when the Assembly adjourns without electing judges
to fill empty positions, the constitution assigns the Governor appointing responsibility. 3 4 Because Republicans have not committed to supporting Governor Kaine's choices, the well-qualified jurists whom he appointed will serve five months without the
assurance that the 2009 Assembly will elect them.35 This uncertainty presumably reduced the eligible candidate pool for these
crucial judicial offices. Although considerable prestige and business-generating publicity may attend someone's short-term appointment to high level offices-such as SCC commissioner, supreme court justice, and court of appeals judge-numerous
qualified attorneys might be unwilling to disrupt their practices

TIMES-DISPATCH, July 11, 2008, at A5 [hereinafter Schapiro, Lawmaker Gridlock].
31. See Future Vacancies in the Federal Judiciary-l10th Congress, http://www.us
courts.gov/ctapps/webnovada/CF_FB_301/archived/futurevaclO001-08.
(last visited Oct.
24, 2008); see also supra note 26.
32. See, e.g., Anita Kumar, Bickering in Va. General Assembly Leaves Judicial Posts
Open, WASH. POST, May 11, 2008, at C8; Jeff E. Schapiro, Lawmakers Approve Bond Bill,
RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 2008, at Al; Julian Walker, Legislators Near Deal on Selecting Judges, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 9, 2008, at B1.
33. See Schapiro, Lawmaker Gridlock, supra note 30; Julian Walker, Lawmakers Fail
To Reach a Deal on Naming Judges, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, July 10, 2008, at B3.
34. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7; supra note 13 and accompanying text.
35. See Markon, Sniper Judge, supra note 30; Schapiro, Lawmaker Gridlock, supra
note 30.
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for possible election. 3 6 Sitting judges would be even less willing to
accept elevation and risk losing their judicial positions.
Even though Governor Kaine skillfully navigated the obstacles
described above, this judicial selection process is ineffective. A regime that intrinsically shrinks the number of eligible candidates
and inherently allows protracted vacancies lacks efficacy. The
SCC operated for nine months absent one commissioner, imposing pressure on the remaining two members and the Commission
staff. The supreme court similarly functioned over two months
with a vacancy. Both entities and the court of appeals will operate for five months with lingering uncertainty about the new appointees' tenure. The circuit courts have employed substitute
judges who are less familiar with the courts' procedures, traditions, and staff, which delays case resolution and reduces efficiency. 37 These developments have impaired judicial operations, undermining the delivery of justice and public respect.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Because Virginia's regime for appointing judges is apparently
less effective than it could be, the Commonwealth should evaluate
several ways to reform this system. The possible alterations may
be categorized into near-term, comparatively mundane devices,
which can usually be implemented by passing legislation, and
relatively dramatic techniques, most of which require constitutional amendment.
A. A Short-Term Measure
One measure that the Old Dominion could adopt in the near
term is a merit selection commission that would recommend mul-

36. See Jeff E. Schapiro, Kaine Fills 2 Court Spots, One on SCC, RICH. TIMESDISPATCH, Aug. 16, 2008, at Al; Carl Tobias, Kaine Can Thread Judicial Needle, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH, July 22, 2008, at A9; see also Editorial, Week's End, RICH. TIMESDISPATCH, July 12, 2008, at A10.
37. See Julian Walker, Wheels of Justice Grind Slower over Shortage of Judges,
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Aug. 4, 2008, at B1; see also Tobias, supra note 36. On October 7, 2008,
Governor Kaine announced the appointment of three judges to fill vacancies on the Circuit
Court for the City of Norfolk. Julian Walker & Michelle Washington, Kaine Appoints
Three to Norfolk Circuit Court, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 8, 2008, http://hamptonroads.com/
print/483226. The court had functioned for months without one-third of its nine judges,
and the court's clerk called the appointments "long overdue."' Id.
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tiple, excellent candidates whom the General Assembly in turn
could elect. 38 When evaluating the advisability of a panel, legislative members might want to consult the accumulated experience
of the states and the federal government, which have used analogous entities. 3 9 The Assembly may correspondingly think about
issues such as commission composition, panel members' terms,
who should be the chair, whether the commission must submit a
minimum number of candidates, and whether the legislature may
reject the names tendered and request additional candidates. 4 0
More specifically, this panel should be comprised of highly qualified judges, legislators, attorneys, and citizens whom the Assembly and the Governor appoint. The panel might also include seats
that are designated for specific interests, as is prescribed for certain Virginia agencies. 4 1
The idea warrants serious consideration because many of the
fifty jurisdictions and the federal government have successfully
deployed commissions principally to advise governors when appointing judges and presidents when submitting judicial nominees. 42 Virginia has employed a similar panel;4 3 observers criticized the approach, however, arguing that the commission was
less balanced than it could have been and might have compromised judicial independence.44 Thus, the Commonwealth should
ensure that the panel has diverse membership, especially vis-Avis political party affiliation, geography, race, and gender, and
has the requisite expertise, professionalism, and resources to
avoid threatening judicial independence.45

38. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. When the Governor exercises judicial
appointment power, the official should consider using a panel, although time restraints
might limit its efficacy.
39. See supra notes 7, 22-23 and accompanying text.
40. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 306; see also infra note 41 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1302 (Cum. Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2102 (Repl. Vol. 2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.9 (Cum. Supp. 2008).
42. See supranotes 7, 22-23 and accompanying text.
43. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
44. See supranotes 25-26 and accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 24, 40-41 and accompanying text.
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B. Longer-Term Measures
Virginia may also wish to consider longer-term, more dramatic
alterations that would replace General Assembly election with
various alternatives, although legislators might be understandably reluctant to relinquish the authority they currently possess to
elect judges. Perhaps the most promising option is gubernatorial
nomination, which many jurisdictions require to be premised on
merit selection panel recommendations with legislative advice
and consent.
This notion deserves careful analysis, as it provides safeguards
against gubernatorial overreaching through the merit selection
commission and Assembly rejection of nominees found unqualified, thus preserving legislative authority and the balance of
power among the three branches. The idea mirrors the federal
system, which has operated rather efficaciously for more than two
centuries, although the federal approach has recently experienced
the same partisanship and divisiveness that have plagued the
Virginia Assembly's election of judges.46 Nonetheless, the concept
warrants exploration because the federal regime has generally
proven efficacious. The Governor and the legislature, therefore,
should attempt to increase bipartisanship to defuse the politicization that has recently suffused Virginia judicial selection because
these efforts improve the process, safeguard judicial independence, and enhance public respect for all three branches.47
The popular election of judges is another major alternative that
numerous states have long applied, even though the system is
less ubiquitous than it used to be.48 This scheme has obvious superficial democratic appeal because the regime allows the people
to elect members of the bench directly. Many observers, however,
have articulated a growing number of, and increasingly persuasive, criticisms of judicial elections. For example, when judicial
candidates accept campaign contributions from lawyers and parties who litigate cases before them, this creates the appearance of
impropriety, while judges' reliance on this money and political
46. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Christopher Peace, As Statesmen, GOP Should Confirm Governor's Pick
for SCC, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 7, 2008, at E4; Jeff E. Schapiro, Path to Naming
Judges Can Be Rocky, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr. 25, 2008, at B2. For additional support
for this measure, see Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 304; ABA, supra note 6, at
70-73.
48. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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party support threatens judicial independence.49 When candidates assume positions on social or political issues, this analogously undermines the perception of impartiality. 50 The lack of
instructive information conveyed in judicial campaigns concomitantly leaves voters uninformed, while the distasteful rhetoric exchanged undercuts public confidence.51 Most of these factors dis-

suade numerous qualified attorneys from seeking judicial office.52
Therefore, the approach is not viable, and the Commonwealth
should eschew it.53
These longer-term reforms are comparatively far-reaching and
their institution would require amendment of the Constitution of
Virginia.54 Therefore, the Assembly may want to invoke the venerable study commission process, which legislators have long
employed to analyze a number of particularly difficult complications and formulate efficacious solutions. 55 A study commission
should comprehensively assess the dilemma that judicial selection currently presents, consider a broad spectrum of promising
solutions, and recommend various improvements which the
people of Virginia might concomitantly adopt through the constitutional amendment process. 56
If the Commonwealth finds the longer-term reforms too drastic,
the General Assembly should at least seriously consider the
short-term merit selection panel idea broached above or create a
study commission to evaluate the notion. Should legislators nevertheless reject both of these approaches, they must institute

49. I rely substantially here and in the remainder of this paragraph on Behrens &
Silverman, supra note 6, at 277-79; ABA, supra note 6.
50. See, e.g., Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 292-94; Mary Libby Payne, Mississippi JudicialElections:A Problem Without a Solution? 67 MISS. L.J. 1, 9-25 (1997).
51. See, e.g., Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 290-91; Nathan S. Heffernan,
Judicial Responsibility, Judicial Independence and the Election of Judges, 80 MARQ. L.
REV. 1031, 1044-45 (1997).
52. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
973, 995-96 (2001); Behrens & Silverman, supra note 6, at 285-87; Heffernan, supra note
51, at 1036-37, 1044.
53. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, should Virginia decide to adopt popular
elections, the Commonwealth should at least prescribe initial General Assembly election
or gubernatorial appointment and subsequent retention elections. See supra note 6 and
accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 2, 14-15 and accompanying text; see also Behrens & Silverman,
supra note 6, at 308.
55. See VA. HOUSE OF DELEGATES R. 20 (2008); VA. SENATE R. 19(a), (i) (2008).
56. See VA. CONST. art. XII.
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measures that will depoliticize the selection process and enhance
bipartisanship. 57
CONCLUSION

The 2008 Virginia General Assembly's failure to fill numerous
vacancies by electing judges has impeded judicial operations and
undercut public respect, while this development suggests that the
selection process is ineffective and merits remediation or amelioration. Therefore, the Commonwealth should carefully explore
numerous alternatives which may improve the selection of
judges.

57.

See supra note 47 and accompanying text.

